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## BC ELECTION LAW IS CHANGING.

### Here is what the government is recommending, what it means for you, and what is missing.

In May 2026, the Special Committee on Democratic and Electoral Reform — an all-party committee of the BC Legislative Assembly — released a report recommending 48 amendments to the *Election Act* following its review of the 2024 provincial election. Some of those changes are administrative. Others expand government authority over political speech, personal data, and who holds power over elections — without the legal safeguards that ordinarily accompany that kind of authority. This document covers both.

Read this first	Then read this	Then this
Eight plain-language statements. What is changing. No legal language.	The detail for each change — what the report says and what it leaves out.	The sourced record — every claim tied to a recommendation number or report page.

**SOURCE** Review of the 2024 Provincial General Election · Special Committee on Democratic and Electoral Reform · Second Session, 43rd Parliament · May 14, 2026 · 48 recommendations

**STANDARD** Every claim anchored to a named recommendation, report page, or Act section. Verified through a 12-point factual review. No inference stated as fact.

**BY** Democratic Oversight Papers · June 2026

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## **EIGHT CHANGES — IN PLAIN LANGUAGE**

Read each numbered statement. That is the change. The paragraph below explains what the report says and what it does not say.

### **1**

#### **Elections BC will be able to legally compel anyone — including social media platforms — to hand over records, without a court approving the order first.**

The committee recommends giving the Chief Electoral Officer the power to issue production orders against communications that Elections BC determines violate the Act's misinformation and disinformation provisions. The recommendation does not specify what categories of records can be demanded and places no limit on the scope of what can be compelled. Currently, compelling someone to produce records of this kind requires a court order — a judge independently reviews whether the demand is justified. This recommendation removes that step. During public consultation, one participant recommended that any such orders require judicial approval, be limited to specific investigations, and notify the person whose records are sought. None of those conditions appear in the recommendation.

*Production orders of this type, under Canadian administrative law, can require the production of:*

- Account details behind a post — name, email address, phone number, and IP address
- Private messages or direct messages connected to the communication
- Metadata showing when and where content was created or posted
- Records of how content was distributed, promoted, or amplified
- Records of who received or shared the content

*Recommendation 43 · s. 276.01 Election Act · Report pp. 40, 44, 50*

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### **2**

#### **Elections BC will be able to order you to correct or retract something you said about an election — without a court order, and against a standard the law does not define.**

Recommendation 44 directs that Elections BC be authorized to order corrections to communications that violate the misinformation and disinformation provisions. The Election Act does not define what 'misleading' means. The committee's own deliberations note (report p. 44) that distinguishing opinion from misinformation is important for protecting free speech. No recommendation proposes adding a definition. Elections BC would determine what counts as misinformation and then order its correction, without independent judicial review.

*Recommendation 44 · ss. 234.1–234.5 Election Act · Report pp. 44, 50*

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### 3

#### **Election officials who make these decisions cannot be sued — and the law does not define when that protection ends.**

Recommendation 6 gives election officials immunity from legal action when acting in good faith. The recommendation does not define ‘good faith,’ does not identify who decides whether an official acted in good faith, and does not specify what conduct falls outside the protection. This immunity applies alongside the new production order and corrections order powers. If Elections BC issues an order you believe is wrong, legal action against the official who issued it may not be available.

*Recommendation 6 · Report pp. 41, 48*

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### 4

#### **Government election powers can be handed to private contractors who are not public servants and are not subject to the same rules of accountability.**

Currently, the Election Act allows the Chief Electoral Officer to delegate authority only to individuals appointed under specific provisions of the Act. Recommendation 5 removes that limit. The CEO would be able to give statutory election powers to any individual, regardless of whether they are a public servant. No audit, oversight, or accountability mechanism for those individuals is specified in the recommendation. Combined with Recommendation 6, a private individual could hold government election powers, exercise those powers including issuing production orders, and be protected from lawsuits — with no defined standard for when that protection ends.

*Recommendation 5 · s. 12(2)(e) Election Act · Report pp. 18, 41, 48*

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## 5

### **The federal government will share your immigration and residency status with Elections BC. The recommendation specifies no rules for how long that data is kept or who can access it.**

Recommendation 7 authorizes the Chief Electoral Officer to enter data-sharing agreements with the Government of Canada to collect information about non-citizens for the purposes of the Election Act and to update the Provincial List of Voters. The report notes at page 16 that this involves access to citizenship and permanent residency status information held by the federal immigration ministry. The recommendation does not specify retention periods, which officials may access the data, or when it must be deleted. This information would be held alongside your voter registration record. BC's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) applies to Elections BC as a government body and provides a general framework for personal information handling. The recommendation specifies no additional rules for this data beyond what FIPPA already requires, and does not require the information-sharing agreement to include specific retention, access, or deletion terms.

*Federal immigration records shared under agreements of this type typically include:*

- Whether a person is a Canadian citizen, permanent resident, or neither
- The date citizenship or permanent residency status was granted
- Country of birth or origin as recorded in immigration files
- Whether a person's status has lapsed, been revoked, or is under review

*Recommendation 7 · Report pp. 16, 41–42, 48–49*

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## 6

### **Every political donation you make will be tagged with a unique tracking ID — assigned by the political party receiving your money, not by a neutral body.**

Recommendation 20 amends the Election Act to require all political contribution recipients to assign a unique contributor ID to each individual donor and include it in financial reports. The report notes at page 16 that each political party would assign the ID to its own donors. The recommendation does not specify standards for how IDs are generated, stored, or protected, or what happens to donor ID records if a party dissolves or merges. BC's Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) currently applies to political parties, as confirmed by the BC Supreme Court in 2024. However, Bill C-4 — now law since March 12, 2026 — creates a federal 'exclusive' privacy regime for parties that creates unresolved constitutional uncertainty about whether PIPA continues to apply to contributor ID records.

*In practice, this means:*

- Every donation you make to that party, its candidates, and affiliated constituency associations can be linked to a single record under your ID
- That record is created and held by the party itself — not by Elections BC or a neutral body
- Donations you make across multiple elections accumulate under the same ID
- The recommendation specifies no rules for how long the party must keep your record, what it can do with it, or what happens if the party merges, dissolves, or shares data with a successor organization

*Recommendation 20 · s. 190 Election Act · Report pp. 16, 25, 49*

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## 7

**A network of partner organizations will manage what the public is told about elections. There are no published criteria for who gets into this network or what they must disclose about their own funding.**

Recommendation 46 directs Elections BC to develop a network of trusted partners to reinforce the reliability and integrity of electoral processes by ensuring accurate information is widely disseminated. The recommendation specifies no selection criteria for partner organizations, no disclosure requirements for their funding sources, no conflict-of-interest rules, and no accountability mechanism. The Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions (CSDI), which recommended this network in its testimony, cited research it conducted with the Media Ecosystem Observatory (MEO) during the 2024 election as part of its evidence base. CSDI's institutional funding relationships are not disclosed in the report.

*Organizations operating in this type of role in other jurisdictions have:*

- Worked with social media platforms to flag content as accurate or inaccurate
- Provided authoritative sources to journalists covering election-related stories
- Coordinated with broadcasters and publishers on what information receives prominence during an election period
- Issued rapid public responses to content they determine misrepresents election processes or results

*Recommendation 46 · Report pp. 39, 41, 50*

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## 8

**The Chief Electoral Officer gains authority to set rules by regulation, issue penalties, and control official publications — decisions previously made by or requiring the Legislature or the courts.**

Three recommendations expand what the CEO can decide without returning to the Legislature. Recommendation 2 allows the CEO to impose monetary penalties for voting violations — offences that currently require criminal prosecution, with penalties including fines of up to \$20,000, imprisonment up to two years, and a prohibition on voting or holding office in provincial elections for up to seven years — through an administrative process instead. Recommendation 26 authorizes the CEO to prescribe additional financial disclosure requirements for fundraising functions and third-party sponsors by regulation, meaning those requirements are set by the CEO's office rather than enacted by the Legislature. Recommendation 48 gives the CEO discretion over the content and publication methods for statutory notices, replacing the current requirement to publish in the BC Gazette and newspapers.

*Recommendations 2, 26, 48 · Report pp. 18, 28, 48, 51*

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## WHAT IS NOT IN THE REPORT

The following protections were raised during public consultation. Each is recorded in the report. None appears in the 48 recommendations.

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### — A definition of ‘misleading’

Recommendations 43 and 44 expand enforcement over communications. The provisions they enforce do not define ‘misleading.’ No recommendation adds one.

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### — Judicial oversight for production and corrections orders

One participant recommended court approval, scope limited to specific investigations, and notification to the person whose records are sought. None of these appear in Recommendations 43 or 44.

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### — Rules for how long citizenship data is kept and who can access it

Recommendation 7 authorizes federal data-sharing on non-citizens. FIPPA applies to Elections BC generally, but the recommendation specifies no additional retention, access, or deletion rules for this data, and does not require the information-sharing agreement to include specific terms on any of these points.

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### — Accountability rules for individuals given delegated election authority

Recommendation 5 allows election powers to be given to private individuals outside the public service. No oversight or audit mechanism is specified.

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### — Selection criteria and funding disclosure for the trusted partners network

Recommendation 46 creates the network without specifying how organizations are selected, what funding they must disclose, or how conflicts of interest are managed.

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### — Specific composition protections for the permanent post-election review committee

Recommendation 1 creates a standing review committee. General parliamentary practice provides that membership traditionally reflects party representation and is specified in the appointing motion. The recommendation adds no specific protections against mid-process membership changes beyond what general parliamentary practice already provides.

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### — Disclosure of institutional relationships for testifying witnesses

The Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions cited research conducted with the Media Ecosystem Observatory during the 2024 election as part of its evidence base. CSDI’s institutional funding relationships are not disclosed in the report.

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### — An independent oversight body for Elections BC

One consultation participant proposed a citizen oversight commission with powers to audit, monitor, publish data, and adjudicate complaints. Others made similar recommendations for oversight boards and audits. Both are recorded in the report. Neither is among the 48 recommendations.

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# THE SOURCED RECORD

Every claim in the eight statements above is anchored here to a specific recommendation number, report page, or Act section. This section is for those who want to verify, challenge, or build on the plain-language summary. All corrections from the 12-point factual review have been applied.

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## 1. SPEECH ENFORCEMENT — PRODUCTION AND CORRECTIONS ORDERS

Amendments to the *Election Act* in 2023 added sections 234.1 to 234.5, prohibiting misrepresentation and false statements regarding election results, processes, candidates, and officials. The Phase 2 report makes three recommendations expanding enforcement of those provisions.

**Rec. 43** Section 276.01 of the *Election Act* to be amended to authorize the Chief Electoral Officer to issue administrative production orders for communications that violate the misinformation and disinformation provisions. The recommendation does not specify what categories of records can be compelled or place any limit on the scope of what can be demanded.

**Rec. 44** Elections BC to be authorized to order action on corrections as needed. Recommendation 44 follows Recommendation 43 under the Awareness and Information heading. The formal text of Recommendation 44 does not specify the type of communications or circumstances to which it applies.

**Rec. 45** Elections BC to pre-emptively address misinformation and disinformation by increasing public awareness and education efforts and making verification easier and more efficient.

**Gap documented within the report itself:** The committee's deliberations (p. 44) state that 'making a clear distinction between opinion and misinformation is important to protect individuals' rights to free speech.' Sections 234.1 to 234.5 do not define 'misleading.' No recommendation proposes a definition. Recommendations 43 and 44 expand enforcement authority against an undefined standard. During consultation, one participant recommended that production orders require judicial pre-authorization, have their scope limited to specific investigations, and include explicit user notification rights. None of those conditions appear in the adopted recommendations.

**Who cited what:** The Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions (CSDI), in testimony to the committee, cited a 2025 study conducted by the Media Ecosystem Observatory (MEO) which found that 43 percent of Canadians had encountered claims that vote counts were faked or otherwise illegally manipulated, and that approximately 100 accounts were responsible for over two-thirds of those claims on platform X. This research informed the committee's misinformation findings. The committee recorded CSDI's evidence — CSDI cited MEO; the committee did not independently cite MEO. CSDI's institutional funding relationships are not disclosed in the report.

*Report pp. 38–40, 44, 50 · Recommendations 43, 44, 45*

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## 2. EXPANSION OF CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER AUTHORITY

**Rec. 2** The *Election Act* to be amended to provide the CEO with an option to issue administrative monetary penalties for voting violations under section 257 — including voting when not entitled to do so and voting more than once, which currently carry criminal penalties of up to \$20,000, imprisonment up to two years, and

a prohibition on voting or holding office in provincial elections for up to seven years — and for repeat campaigning within 100 metres of voting places. Recommendation 2 adds an administrative pathway that does not require criminal prosecution.

**Rec. 5** The Chief Electoral Officer to be allowed to delegate statutory authority to any individual necessary to exercise assigned powers or perform assigned duties, regardless of employment status under the *Public Service Act*. Currently, section 12(2)(e) of the *Election Act* limits delegation to individuals appointed under specific provisions of the Act. Recommendation 5 removes that constraint. No accountability or oversight framework for individuals receiving delegated authority outside the public service is specified.

**Rec. 26** The CEO to be authorized to prescribe additional disclosure requirements for fundraising function reports and third-party sponsor reports by regulation. Those requirements would be set by the CEO's office rather than enacted by the Legislature.

**Rec. 48** The CEO to be provided discretion over the content and publication methods for statutory notices. Currently, the Act requires publication in the *BC Gazette* and newspapers. Recommendation 48 replaces this with CEO discretion.

*Report pp. 18, 25, 28, 41–42, 48, 51 · Recommendations 2, 5, 26, 48*

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### 3. OVERSIGHT AND LEGAL IMMUNITY

**Rec. 1** A parliamentary committee to be appointed after every provincial general election to review election administration and make recommendations for future elections. BC's Standing Orders and parliamentary practice provide that committee membership traditionally reflects party representation in the Assembly, and that the composition of a special committee is typically specified in the motion appointing it. The recommendation does not specify additional rules for this committee's composition, the appointment process, or protections against mid-process membership changes beyond what general parliamentary practice already provides.

**Rec. 6** Election officials acting in good faith to be provided with immunity from legal action consistent with best practices in other Canadian jurisdictions. The recommendation does not define 'good faith' or 'bad faith,' does not identify who makes that determination, and does not specify whether immunity extends to individuals holding delegated authority under Recommendation 5.

**Combined effect of Recommendations 5 and 6:** Recommendation 5 allows the CEO to grant statutory election powers to any individual regardless of public service status. Recommendation 6 provides immunity from legal action for election officials acting in good faith. The report does not specify whether individuals holding delegated authority under Recommendation 5 qualify as 'election officials' under Recommendation 6, and does not define the boundary of that immunity. One consultation participant proposed a citizen oversight commission — with powers to audit, monitor, publish data, and adjudicate complaints. Others made similar recommendations for oversight boards and audits. Both are recorded in the report at page 17. Neither is among the 48 recommendations.

*Report pp. 17, 41, 48 · Recommendations 1, 6*

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### 4. PERSONAL DATA COLLECTION

**Rec. 7** The Chief Electoral Officer to be authorized to enter information-sharing agreements with the Government of Canada to collect information about non-citizens for the purposes of the *Election Act* and to update the Provincial List of Voters. The report notes at page 16 that this involves access to citizenship and permanent residency status information held by the federal immigration ministry. The recommendation does not specify retention periods, access restrictions, or data destruction requirements beyond what BC's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) already requires of Elections BC as a government body. The recommendation does not require the information-sharing agreement itself to include specific retention, access, or deletion terms.

**Rec. 20** Section 190 of the *Election Act* to be amended to require all political contribution filers to assign a unique contributor ID to each individual donor and include it in financial reports. The report notes at page 16 that each political party would assign the ID to its own donors. No standards for ID generation, storage, or protection are specified in the recommendation. BC's Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) currently applies to political parties, as confirmed by the BC Supreme Court in 2024 (*Liberal Party of Canada v. The Complainants*, 2024 BCSC 814). Bill C-4 — now law since March 12, 2026 — creates a federal 'exclusive' privacy regime for parties, creating unresolved constitutional uncertainty about whether PIPA continues to apply to contributor ID records.

**Federal parallel:** Bill C-25, tabled in the House of Commons on March 26, 2026, grants the Commissioner of Canada Elections new authority over conspiracy, attempt, counselling, and accessory liability for false information offences at the federal level. BC's Recommendations 43 and 44 expand enforcement under sections 234.1 to 234.5 provincially. Both tracks are proceeding simultaneously. Neither Bill C-25 nor the amended provincial provisions defines 'misleading.'

*Report pp. 16, 25, 41–42, 48–49 · Recommendations 7, 20 · Bill C-25, First Reading, House of Commons, March 26, 2026*

## 5. THE TRUSTED PARTNERS NETWORK

**Rec. 46** Elections BC to develop a network of trusted partners, including local authorities, to reinforce the reliability and integrity of electoral processes by ensuring accurate information is widely disseminated. The recommendation specifies no selection criteria for partner organizations, no funding disclosure requirements, no conflict-of-interest rules, and no accountability mechanism.

**Rec. 47** The provincial government and Elections BC to respond to challenges posed by artificial intelligence, including by assessing the accuracy of dominant chatbot models, disseminating accurate information, and supporting civil society experimentation with AI to help citizens better understand election administration. No selection criteria, funding standards, or accountability framework for participating organizations is specified.

**Who testified and what they recommended:** The Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions (CSDI) appeared as a key witness. CSDI's submissions directly produced Recommendations 45, 46, and 47. CSDI also recommended establishing a future centre of excellence for democratic engagement with long-term monitoring capacity across elections (report p. 41). In testimony, CSDI cited research it conducted with the Media Ecosystem Observatory (MEO) during the 2024 election as part of its evidence base (report p. 39). CSDI's institutional funding relationships are not disclosed in the report. CSDI is listed as a consultation participant in the report's appendix.

## 6. ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND FINANCIAL REPORTING

**Rec. 3** The *Election Act* to be amended to establish penalties for repeated non-compliance by political parties that file late or inaccurate nomination contest reports and by third-party sponsors that do not file changes to registration information.

**Rec. 21** A minimum age for making political contributions to be established. The minimum age is not specified in the recommendation — it is left to be determined through subsequent legislation.

**Rec. 28** Section 176(1) of the *Election Act* to be amended to disqualify individuals who have failed to file a report under the *Local Elections Campaign Financing Act* from acting as financial agents or auditors in provincial elections.

## THE NET EFFECT

Each of the eight provincial changes and four federal instruments above has been documented individually. This page assembles them into a single view. Every claim below is sourced to a recommendation, report page, or bill already cited in this document. No new inference is introduced.

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### **Speech Enforcement — Undefined at Both Levels, Simultaneously**

BC's Recommendations 43 and 44 allow Elections BC to compel production of records and order corrections to communications, without judicial approval, under sections 234.1–234.5 of the Election Act. Those sections do not define 'misleading.' Bill C-25 expands federal enforcement over false information respecting elections under the same undefined standard, year-round. A person who publishes commentary about an election in BC faces potential compelled disclosure provincially and federal enforcement action for the same communication — under two separate regimes, operating simultaneously, neither of which defines the threshold. The committee's own deliberations (report p. 44) acknowledge that distinguishing opinion from misinformation is important for protecting free speech. No recommendation at either level adds a definition.

*Recs. 43, 44 · Report p. 44 · Bill C-25, First Reading, March 26, 2026*

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### **Privacy — Four Expanding Data Streams, No Unified Rules**

Four separate streams of personal data are being created or expanded simultaneously. First, BC's Recommendation 7 authorizes Elections BC to collect citizenship and residency status from the federal government. BC's Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) applies to Elections BC as a government body, but the recommendation specifies no additional rules and does not require the information-sharing agreement to include specific retention, access, or deletion terms. Second, Recommendation 20 requires political parties to assign a unique tracking ID to every donor — held by the party, not a neutral body, with no protection standards specified in the recommendation itself. Third, Bill C-22 compels electronic service providers to hand over subscriber identification without a warrant. Fourth, Bill C-34 creates government-accredited researcher access to platform data. Critically, Bill C-4 — already law since March 12, 2026 — creates a federal privacy regime for political parties described as 'exclusive.' BC's Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) currently gives BC residents the right to access and correct party-held data, confirmed by the BC Supreme Court in 2024. C-4's 'exclusive' language creates unresolved constitutional uncertainty about whether PIPA continues to apply to party-held contributor ID data. C-4 itself provides no independent right of access or correction — relying instead on self-determined party policies. No instrument at either level specifies how these data streams interact, who can access them across jurisdictions, or when data must be destroyed.

*Recs. 7, 20 · Bill C-4, Royal Assent March 12, 2026 · Bill C-22, First Reading, March 12, 2026 · Bill C-34, First Reading, June 10, 2026*

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## Accountability — Oversight Reduced at Every Level

Recommendation 6 gives election officials immunity from legal action with no defined standard for when that protection ends. Recommendation 5 allows the CEO to delegate statutory election powers to private individuals outside the public service, with no oversight mechanism specified. Recommendations 43 and 44 require no judicial pre-authorization. Recommendation 46 creates a trusted partners network with no selection criteria or funding disclosure requirements. Bill C-34's Digital Safety Commission sets its own compliance standards by regulation. A proposal for an independent citizen oversight commission for Elections BC — with powers to audit, monitor, publish data, and adjudicate complaints — was raised during consultation and is recorded in the report (p. 17). It is not among the 48 recommendations.

*Recs. 1, 5, 6, 43, 44, 46 · Report p. 17 · Bill C-34, First Reading, June 10, 2026*

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## Institutional Authority — Centralizing Without Legislative Specification

Recommendation 2 allows the CEO to impose penalties previously requiring criminal prosecution through an administrative process. Recommendation 26 authorizes the CEO to prescribe additional financial disclosure requirements by regulation, bypassing the Legislature. Recommendation 48 gives the CEO discretion over statutory notice publication. Recommendation 1 creates a permanent post-election committee with no composition rules. Bill C-25 requires parties to establish their own personal information policies — self-determined, not independently audited. Bill C-34's Digital Safety Commission is empowered to set standards, accredit researchers, and share information with the RCMP under rules it largely defines itself. Across both levels of government, the pattern is consistent: authority is expanding, and the specification of limits on that authority is being deferred to the bodies that hold it.

*Recs. 1, 2, 5, 26, 48 · Bill C-25, March 26, 2026 · Bill C-34, June 10, 2026*

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## FEDERAL CONTEXT — PARALLEL LEGISLATIVE TRACKS

The following federal bills are proceeding simultaneously with BC's DER Phase 2 recommendations. None is referenced in the DER Phase 2 report. Each is sourced from its parliamentary record. Parallels to BC's recommendations are noted. No claim about coordinated intent is made.

**Bill C-4 Making Life More Affordable for Canadians Act** · Royal Assent March 12, 2026 — already law. Part 4 amends the Canada Elections Act to establish a national, uniform, exclusive regime governing political parties' handling of personal information. C-4 itself provides no independent right to access or correct data parties hold — parties rely on self-determined policies. BC's Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) currently gives BC residents the right to access and correct party-held data, confirmed by the BC Supreme Court in 2024 (*Liberal Party of Canada v. The Complainants*, 2024 BCSC 814). C-4's explicit 'exclusive' language creates unresolved constitutional uncertainty about whether PIPA continues to apply to party-held donor data, including the contributor IDs created under BC's Recommendation 20. The DER Phase 2 report was released May 14, 2026 — two months after C-4 received Royal Assent. C-4 is not referenced in the report.

**Bill C-25 Strong and Free Elections Act** · First Reading, March 26, 2026. Expands the Commissioner of Canada Elections' authority over conspiracy, attempt, counselling, and accessory liability for false information offences. The prohibition on making or publishing false or misleading information respecting

elections is not limited to the election period — it applies year-round. The bill also introduces ‘new requirements relating to political parties’ policies for the protection of personal information’ (C-25 Summary, First Reading). Parties will hold contributor tracking IDs under BC’s Recommendation 20 while being subject to self-determined personal information policies under C-25 — with no independent oversight specified in either instrument. Neither this Act nor BC’s sections 234.1–234.5 defines ‘misleading.’

**Bill C-22 Lawful Access Act** · First Reading, March 12, 2026. Compels telecommunications providers to identify subscribers without a warrant where reasonable suspicion exists, and requires electronic service providers to assist in providing data to law enforcement and CSIS on request. Parallel to BC’s Recommendation 43, which creates administrative production orders compelling platforms to hand over records without court approval.

**Bill C-34 Safe Social Media Act** · First Reading, June 10, 2026. Creates the Digital Safety Commission with compliance, audit, and enforcement powers over platforms. Defines ‘harmful content’ to include content that ‘foments hatred’ — a category with no precise threshold, mirroring BC’s undefined misinformation standard. Includes information-sharing provisions with the RCMP. The Commission will also ‘accredit researchers for data access’ to platform data (C-34 Summary). This formally creates a government-controlled pathway for approved researchers to access platform data — institutionalizing at the federal level the same researcher-access model documented provincially in this series. At first reading only — not yet law.

*Bill C-4, Royal Assent March 12, 2026 · Bill C-25, First Reading, March 26, 2026 · Bill C-22, First Reading, March 12, 2026 · Bill C-34, First Reading, June 10, 2026*